

Blind Spots	WEST Mainstream Narrative	Time	RUSSIA Mainstream Narrative	Blind Spots
	End of Cold War was a victory for democracy and freedom	1989		
The feeling that it was a painful decision by the USSR leadership, for which Russians paid a huge price and deserved much more in return.		1990	West treated Russia as a 'defeated' country.	
	Domestic political events in Russia are viewed relatively favourably because Yeltsin is believed to be an important partner	1991	No recognition of Russia as an equal partner.	
		1992		Intensity of negative Western view of the Chechnya War is underestimated in Russia.
The use of military force against Parliament shattered the trust in democracy for large parts of the Russian population.		1993		
	Positive image of Russia cracks because of Chechen Wars	1994		
		1995	The West keeps the technology market closed to Russia.	Transformation of NATO from a military defence alliance into an organisation for "out of area" missions was ignored
The negative effects of the economic 'shock therapy' created strong disappointment with Western-style liberal and democratic values.	Russian support for Serbian leader Milošević is met with displeasure.	1996		
		1997	Plans for NATO enlargement violate the agreements reached in the early 1990s.	There was no coherent agenda on this after 1990, rather a complex interplay of different actors, factors and resets.
There is reason to perceive a broken spirit. Russia's discontent with the post-Cold War order starts from the early 1990s.	NATO enlargement served to stabilise former Warsaw Pact states and was not directed against Russia – in particular because NATO was by that time an organisation that was primarily focused on "out of area" operations.	1998	NATO bombing of Belgrade ignores Russia's position and undermines the UN.	
		1999		The Western involvement in the Yugoslav wars – particularly the Kosovo War in 1999 – was primarily driven by other considerations than Russia.
The importance of the Balkan Wars for Russia.		2000	Russian cooperation after 9/11 is not responded to properly. Terrorism threat in Russia is ignored by the West.	
		2001		
	Arrest of Yukos CEO Khodorkovsky and later the Politkovskaya case led to deterioration of Western-Russian relations.	2002		
		2003	Iraq intervention, bypassing the UN Security Council	The Khodorkovsky and Politkovskaya cases were very important for the perception of Russia in the West.
That Russia took an active and cooperative stance in the war on terror is not represented in the Western mainstream narrative.	"Colour Revolutions" (2003, 2004, 2005) were legitimate civil society movements.	2004	"Colour Revolutions" are a Western plot to gain influence in Russia's neighbourhood.	
		2005		Geopolitical considerations (such as an enlargement of Western influence in post-Soviet space) were not relevant in the Western public view on the "colour revolutions".
	Putin's speech at the Munich Security Conference came as a big surprise and led to a reassessment of Russia.	2006	Russian-Georgia conflict is partly a defensive reaction to excessive intervention by the West in the post-Soviet space.	
The tepid reaction reconfirmed the perception that the West is unwilling to engage in substantive discussions.		2007		
		2008	The proposal for a European security treaty is rejected high-handedly by the West.	
	Russian-Georgia war was provoked by and characterised by a disproportionate use of military force by Russia.	2009	The US plans for a Ballistic Missile Defence system mark the start of a new arms race.	
Western public mainstream discourses underestimate how unconvincing the assurance that it was not against Russia is perceived.		2010		
	Duma election and protests against Putin were seen as the Russian "colour revolution" which was brutally suppressed by Putin.	2011		
		2012	Arab Spring provokes criticism of the West for not respecting sovereignty.	
		2013	Russia does not use its veto in the UN Security Council regarding the Libya intervention; however, the intervention is misused for regime change.	Events in Ukraine and Crimea dramatically increased East European countries' fears of a 'New Yalta'
	Russian actions in the Ukraine crisis demonstrated the revisionist and expansionist foreign policy agenda and can only be contained through increased deterrence.	2014		